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 DELAYED PRODUCT INTRODUCTION 
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Abstract 
We investigate the incentives of a monopolistic seller to delay the introduction of a new and improved 
version of his product. By analyzing a three-period model, we show that the seller may prefer to delay 
introducing a new product, even though the enabling technologies for the product are already 
available.  The underlying motivation is analogous to that found in the durable goods monopolist 
literature – the seller suffers from a time inconsistency problem that causes his old and new products 
to cannibalize each other.  Without the ability to remove existing stock of the old product from the 
market, shorten product durability, or pace research and development (R&D), he may respond by 
selling the new product later.  We characterize the equilibria with delayed introduction, and study 
their changes with respect to market and product parameters.  In particular, we show that delayed 
introduction could occur regardless of whether the seller can offer upgrade discounts to consumers, 
that instead, it is related to quality improvement brought about by the new product, durabilities, and 
discount factors.  Further, we show that delayed introduction could bring socially efficient outcomes 
as well.  Based on the insights of the model, we provide practical suggestions on pricing and policies. 
 
Key words: production introduction, timing, pricing, upgrade  
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 1 INTRODUCTION 
Technologies for wideband third-generation (3G) cellular networks and mobile phones have been 
available for several years, yet many telecommunications companies are still reluctant to provide 3G 
mobile phone services.  The use of DVD media for recording, storing and retrieving voluminous data 
has been popular since the beginning of this century, but it was only recently that we started to see 
DVD video recorders being actively promoted by hardware vendors.  The MP3 compression format 
for digital music has been well developed since the late 1990s, but it took several more years before 
we saw vendors of stereo systems include in their products MP3 decoders that read and playback MP3 
files on CDs.  Similarly, we have yet to see widespread use of the MPEG-4 standard in home 
electronic products, even though it became an international standard in the year 2000.  Why do 
hardware vendors hesitate in launching new and better products with cutting-edge technologies? 
The examples above share a number of characteristics.  First, the research and development 
(R&D) of the new technologies were often pioneered by independent researchers or companies, not 
by the hardware vendors who apply the technologies to their products.  The hardware vendors may 
not control when the new technologies are available.  Second, many hardware vendors who consider 
using the new technologies sell products that incorporate previous generations of similar technologies.  
For example, most telecommunications companies currently provide mobile phone services on 
second-generation cellular networks and handsets; many vendors of DVD video recorders are also 
major sellers of conventional videotape recorders.  Third, the markets for products that incorporate 
these new technologies, or earlier generations of similar technologies, tend to be concentrated – they 
are often dominated by a small number of large sellers.  Fourth, products that use these (new or 
earlier-generation) technologies are mostly durable.  They supply long streams of services to 
consumers, and the quality of services does not significantly drop over time.  Hence, consumers often 
take into account the durability of such products when making purchase decisions.  Finally, the 
functional values of products that use earlier-generation technologies are not affected by the presence 
of products with the new technologies.  If consumers do not appreciate the new technologies, they can 
ignore the new products and continue using the products that they have purchased previously.  
Given these common characteristics and the intriguing observation that some sellers seem 
reluctant to launch new products that incorporate better technologies, it is interesting to understand the 
strategic decisions of a seller who currently sells an existing product, and who can choose whether to 
sell a new product with better technologies.  Specifically, suppose a new technology that improves the 
quality of an existing product is invented, and applying it to a new product does not involve 
prohibitively high costs.  Would a seller have incentives to deliberately delay selling the new product?  
If so, under what circumstances would the seller adopt such a strategy? 
We use a stylized economic model which closely follows the spirit of the classical durable 
goods monopolist literature1 to answer the above research questions.  Our model consists of three 
periods, and each period comprises two stages.  In the first stage of each period, a monopolist seller 
makes product and pricing decisions.  In the second stage, consumers observe the offers made by the 
seller and decide whether to buy the product.  The seller can only sell a low-quality product in the first 
period.  In the second period, a new technology arrives that enables him to produce and sell a high-
quality product.  The seller has to choose among three actions: (a) sell the high-quality product in the 
second period; (b) sell the high-quality product in the third period; or (c) do not sell the high-quality 
product in either period. Option (b) corresponds to delayed product introduction – the seller purposely 
chooses not to sell a better product in an earlier period, even though the product is available and he 
could feasibly sell it to consumers.  We further allow the low- and high-quality products to exhibit 
various degrees of durability.   
In our model, we find that under a wide range of conditions, the seller has incentives not to 
sell the new (high-quality) product immediately.  This is because the existing stock of the old (low-
quality) product that has been sold to consumers limits his ability to charge a high price for the new 
                                                 
1  Representative works in this literature include Bulow (1982, 1986), Dhebar (1994), Fishman and Rob (2000), Fudenberg 
and Tirole (1998), Kornish (2001), Lee and Lee (1998), Levinthal and Purohit (1989), Purohit (1994), Stokey (1981), and 
Waldman (1993, 1996a, 1996b).  For an excellent summary, see Waldman (2003). 
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 product (i.e., the old product cannibalizes the new product).  Further, the expectation that there is 
going to be a new product in the future may dampen the incentives of consumers to buy the old 
product.  Unless the price of the old product is low, consumers may prefer to wait and buy the new 
product that promises better quality (i.e., the prospect of a new product in the future cannibalizes the 
old product).  It is these intertemporal cannibalizations between the old and new products that lead the 
seller to delay selling the new product. 
Specifically, by deferring sale of the new product, the seller extends the economic life span of 
the old product, which increases its value to consumers.  It also allows the old product to be used for 
one more period, and hence the old product depreciates more in value; consumers who have bought it 
in an earlier period would then be willing to pay more to upgrade to the new product in a later period.  
This allows the seller to charge a higher price for the new product and earn more profit.2   
To provide useful strategic insights, we analyze our model in two separate scenarios.  In the 
first scenario, the seller cannot implement an upgrade policy.  Hence, all consumers must pay the 
same price to acquire the new product.  In the second scenario, the seller can implement an upgrade 
policy that allows consumers to trade in the old product for the new product at a discounted price.  
Compared with other consumers, those who own the old product pay less to enjoy the new product (in 
other words, the seller can practice price discrimination based on the purchase history of consumers).  
We find that the equilibrium product and pricing strategies in these two scenarios are different.  The 
seller prefers the upgrade policy because it allows him to convince all consumers to purchase the old 
product earlier.  The provision of an upgrade option also leads to socially efficient outcomes.   
Regardless of whether an upgrade policy is provided, however, delayed selling of the new 
product is always optimal for the seller with some combinations of product and consumer 
characteristics.  Therefore, the provision of an upgrade policy may not be the key determinant in the 
introduction timing of next-generation technological products (cf. Fishman and Rob 2000).  Instead, 
we find that the seller’s choice of whether to delay selling the new product is related to product 
durabilities, extent of quality improvement, and the discount factors.  These results are robust to 
changes in the seller’s ability to credibly commit to product strategies. 
Our study provides useful insights for managers of technological products, especially those 
that depend on components developed by external vendors.  Examples include personal computer, 
audio-visual equipment, communication tools, and specialized software (e.g., econometrics or 
statistics software).  For vendors of these products, delaying the sales of new products that use better 
technologies may sometimes be beneficial because of the alleviation of intertemporal cannibalizations.  
Further, if a vendor is hesitant about when to sell a new product, our model suggests that he should 
evaluate the durabilities of his products and the improvement in quality that the new product will 
bring to consumers.  Knowledge of whether consumers are patient is also useful in this context. 
 
2 RELATED WORKS 
The literature on technology diffusion, adoption and strategic management has suggested that fear of 
obsolescence may cause consumers to hesitate or refuse to buy current technological products (Cohen 
et al. 1996; Dhebar 1996; Venkatesh and Brown 2001).  The concern of consumers about product 
obsolescence is particularly noteworthy in high technology markets because the usability of such 
products is often governed by external technological progress, standards or architectures (Morris and 
Ferguson 1993; West and Jason 2000).  Evidently, hardware products suffer from wear and tear, and 
sometimes, changes in communications standards with peripheral technologies. 3   Even software 
products that are supposedly perfectly durable could at times be superseded because of updates in 
processor instruction sets or operating systems.  Therefore, to avoid getting products that could soon 
                                                 
2  In practice, when deciding whether to upgrade a technological product (e.g., personal computer), consumers often need to 
assess the remaining service values of their existing products.  If the existing products are expected to have short life spans, 
consumers may be willing to pay more to upgrade to new products. 
3  For example, the growing popularity of the universal serial bus (USB) interface has rendered many computer peripherals 
that use old communication interfaces, such as parallel or serial ports, obsolete.  Similarly, rapid changes in processor and 
mother board architectures have made old-generation random access memory (RAM) chips incompatible with new PCs.  
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 be obsolete, consumers may wait for new products and defer making purchases – this is often called 
leapfrogging in the literature. 
In response to the threat of leapfrogging by consumers, firms that sell multiple generations of 
similar products may wish to slow down the pace of new product introduction.  This could serve two 
purposes.  First, delayed introduction may dissuade consumers from waiting for new products and 
accumulate buyers for future products (Putsis 1993).  Second, it may lessen the regret of consumers 
who have bought old-generation products (Dhebar 1996). 
Various theoretical studies have responded to the above observations and modeled the timing 
decisions of firms that sell multiple generations of similar products.  Specifically, by studying the 
decisions of a monopolist in a two-period framework, Dhebar (1994) and Kornish (2001) conclude 
that a seller may defer selling new products because if product introduction occurs too frequently, it is 
difficult to make all products appear attractive to consumers.  They have not, however, formally 
characterized any equilibrium that involves delayed product introduction.  Chatterjee and Sugita 
(1990) and Radas and Shugan (1998) show that delayed introduction is optimal when demand is 
uncertain or seasonal and expanding.  Their results stem from specific assumptions on demand 
structures and firms’ knowledge.  By contrast, we show that even if demand is constant and a seller 
has perfect knowledge about consumers, delay is still an optimal strategy in many circumstances.   
Our study is perhaps closest to that of Fishman and Rob’s (2000), which illustrates that in a 
continuous-time framework with homogeneous consumers, no upgrade policies, and perfectly durable 
products, a monopolist’s rate of product innovation would be too low, which could cause inefficient 
delays in new product introductions.  They show that with an upgrade policy, however, the seller 
would not delay new product introductions,4 which is different from what we report in this paper.  Our 
setting differs from that of Fishman and Rob’s in three aspects.  First, in their setting, product 
innovation involves R&D costs, and new products are launched as soon as they become available.  
Hence, their concept of delay is that of innovation, not of introduction per se.  In our case, product 
innovation is exogenous and fixed; we focus on the seller’s strategic choice of when to sell a new 
product that has just become available – a decision that follows product innovation and does not 
involve R&D costs.  Second, they consider only perfectly durable products.  By contrast, we include 
durability as a model parameter, and that allows us to extend our insights to different technological 
products, especially those that work closely with base products (as in computer software and hardware) 
or peripheral components (see footnote 3 and the related discussion above).  Third, they do not 
explicitly demonstrate that the seller would prefer a strategy with delayed product introduction.  By 
contrast, we show that under a wide range of conditions, the seller would prefer delayed introduction 
owing to revenue but not cost considerations. 
 
3 THE MODEL 
A monopolist seller is planning to sell two versions of a product over three periods, t = 1, 2 or 3.  In 
period 1, he can only sell a low-quality product, L, with quality qL.  Owing to R&D, a new technology 
arrives in period 2, which allows him to sell a new product, H, with quality qH > qL, in either period 2 
or 3.  For ease of presentation, we normalize qH to one, and hence 0 < qL < qH = 1.  Both the old (low-
quality) and new (high-quality) products are of the same durability n ≥ 2 periods.5  We shall relax this 
assumption and allow for different durabilities later in Section 5.  We further assume zero fixed and 
marginal costs to focus on the strategic choices of the seller in response to market demand. 
On the demand side, consumers are homogeneous, and we normalize their size and valuation 
for quality to one.  Each consumer demands at most one unit of each version of the product.  Within 
its life span, the product provides a constant stream of services to consumers; once consumers buy it, 
they enjoy a value that equals its quality in each period of service until it is retired (either because it is 
replaced by a newer product or because it has exceeded its physical life span).  There is no second-
                                                 
4  Lee and Lee (1998) derive similar conclusions in a two-period model with two groups of consumers. 
5  A case with n → ∞ indicates that the product does not deteriorate, e.g., software.  However even software may have 
limited lifespan because the evolution of its complementary products may render it unusable. 
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 hand market; hence, as soon as consumers buy a new product, their old products are retired and 
provide zero usage or residual values.  We use δ to denote a discount factor, which is common to both 
seller and consumers.  We shall relax this assumption in Section 5.  Note that 0 ≤ δ ≤1.  The larger δ is, 
the smaller the discount in future utilities or prices will be. 
Each period in the model further consists of two stages.  In the first stage, the seller makes 
product and pricing decisions based on his knowledge of consumer profiles (how many people bought 
the products in previous periods, the utilities they derive from the products, etc.). In the second stage, 
consumers make purchase decisions, taking into account their valuations for the products and 
expectations about future products.  There is common knowledge on demand, product quality, and 
technological improvement.  Perfect information on history of moves by the seller and consumers is 
available.  We focus on rational expectations equilibria in which consumers form expectations about 
the product and pricing decisions of the seller, and the seller fulfills such expectations. 
We use a tuple {⋅, ⋅, ⋅} to represent the product strategies of the seller in the three periods.  For 
example, {L, -, H} indicates that the seller sells the old product in the first period, does not sell any 
product in the second period, and sells the new product in the third period.  Similarly, {L, H, -} 
denotes a similar strategy except that the new product is sold in the second period instead of the third.  
Because consumers have identical valuations for products, the seller would sell only one product in 
each period.  Further, once a product is sold in a period, it would not be sold in subsequent periods.6   
 
For each product strategy, the seller needs to devise a price schedule.  An equilibrium is sub-game 
perfect if the seller receives optimal profit from his product and price schedules, and if the schedules 
are consistent with consumer expectations.  We use itp  to denote the price of product i at time t, 
where i = L, H and t = 1, 2, or 3, and Hutp  to denote the upgrade price of product H at time t, where t 
= 2 or 3 (upgrade price is necessary only for the new product, and the new product can only be sold at 
or after period 2). 
Given this setting, there are eight possible product strategies for the seller, which are listed in 
the first column of Table 1.7  Our analysis proceeds as follows.  For each product strategy, we 
calculate the total utility that consumers can enjoy from using the sequence of products.  For example, 
consider the strategy {L, -, -}, where the seller only sells the old product in the first period.  
Consumers can enjoy a utility of qL in the first period, δqL in the second period, δ2qL in the third 
period, and so on, until δn-1qL in the last period of the usable life span of the product.  Summing these 
values, the total utility that a consumer can enjoy, 
L
n
L qu ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−=−− δ
δ
1
1
},,{ . 
The utilities that consumers can enjoy from other product strategies are calculated in a similar manner.  
These are all listed in the second column of Table 1. 
Then, based on the utility that consumers derive from each strategy, we compute an optimal 
price schedule and the associated profit that the seller can make by choosing such a strategy.  Finally, 
the profits are compared across the eight product strategies to determine the optimal choices of the 
seller.  We then characterize a few necessary and sufficient conditions that lead to equilibria with 
delayed selling of the new product. 
                                                 
6  In a model where consumers have different valuations for products, or where new consumers enter the market in 
subsequent periods, it is possible for a seller to sell both old and new products in the same period, and he may also sell the 
same products over time. 
7  Note that the seller would consider strategies {L, -, -} and {-, L, -} only when he can credibly commit to his chosen 
product strategies.  Otherwise, he would defect by subsequently selling the new product, and consumers would adjust their 
expectations to account for such anticipated defections.  In Section 6, we discuss the changes in our results when 
commitment is infeasible. 
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+ Since qH = 1, it is omitted from all utility functions. 
++ The seller’s profits that correspond to these price schedules are identical to the consumer utilities reported in 
the second column. 
Table 1.  Product Strategies, Prices and Profits 
 
4 ANALYSIS 
When setting prices, the seller has to consider consumer expectations and their possessions of 
products.  In particular, consumers would buy or upgrade to a new product if and only if the total 
surplus that they derive from the purchase or upgrade is positive (participation constraint) and is more 
than those from any other options (self-selection constraint).  Further, consumers expect new products 
to be available in the future.  Hence, before they make a purchase, they would compare its prospect 
with that of waiting for a new product.   
We separate our analysis into two scenarios.  In the first scenario, the seller cannot provide an 
upgrade option to consumers; hence, all consumers pay the same price for the new product. In the 
second scenario, the seller can devise an upgrade policy, which allows consumers to trade in the old 
product for the new product at a discounted price.  In subsequent analysis, we assume that the seller 
can make credible commitments on product strategies.   
4.1 With No Upgrade Policies 
When the seller cannot identify consumers who have previously bought his product, or when the 
administrative cost of trade-in is too high, it is infeasible for him to offer an upgrade discount to 
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 consumers.  All consumers must then pay the same price for the new product, which means that 
HHu pp 22 =  and HHu pp 33 = . 
Given the product strategies in Table 1, it is easy to calculate the price schedules and profits 
of the seller.  For illustrative purpose, we present the results with respect to strategies {L, -, -} and {L, 
H, -} below.  The price schedules and profits of other strategies can be similarly computed. 
In strategy {L, -, -}, the seller only sells the old product in period 1.  His problem is: 
L
L
p
p
L 1},,{
1
max =−−π , 
s.t. 0
1
1
1 ≥−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
− L
L
n
pqδ
δ
.         (1) 
The left-hand side of (1) is the net surplus that consumers can enjoy by buying the product. 
Essentially, (1) is a participation constraint that ensures that consumers buy the old product in the first 
period.  Solving the above problem, we have:  
L
n
L
L qp ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−== −− δ
δπ
1
1
},,{1 . 
In strategy {L, H, -}, the seller sells the old and new products in the first and second periods.  
He has to set two prices: the price of the old product in period 1, Lp1 , and the price of the new product 
in period 2, Hp2 .  His profit maximization problem is then: 
HL
HL
pp
pp
HL 21},,{, 21
max δπ +=− , 
s.t. 0
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1 ≥⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−+−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
− − H
L
nn
L
L
n
pqpq δ
δ
δ
δδδ
δ
,    (2) 
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n
H
L
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L
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⎫
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−
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δ
δ
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δδδ
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and 
⎭⎬
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The left-hand side of (2)-(4) is the net surplus that consumers enjoy by buying both products.  Similar 
to (1), (2) is a participation constraint.  Both (3) and (4) are self-selection constraints; (3) prevents 
consumers from buying only the old product whereas (4) prevents them from skipping the old product 
and buying only the new one.  Rearranging the terms, (3) and (4) can be simplified as: 
 L
nn
H qp ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−≤
−
δ
δ
δ
δ
1
1
1
1 1
2  ,       (5) 
and 
L
L qp ≤1 .          (6) 
(5) imposes a constraint on the feasible price of the new product.  Because the existing stock of the 
old product continues to provide service if consumers do not buy the new product, the seller could 
only charge consumers for the incremental value the new product brings.  Further, (6) says that the 
price of the old product is bound too because expectations of future switch to the new product reduces 
the life span of and hence the price that consumers are willing to pay for the old product.  Essentially, 
(5) and (6) imply that if the seller wants consumers to buy the new product but cannot offer an 
upgrade discount to existing customers, then he has to absorb the wastage associated with scrapping 
the old product prematurely (i.e., before the end of its physical life span).8 
Solving the seller’s problem subject to (2), (5) and (6), the optimal prices and profits are: 
                                                 
8  Fishman and Rob (2000) make a similar observation in their study of new product introductions.  
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Note that },,{},,{ −− < HLHL uπ .  That is, if the seller chooses to sell two products, then he has to leave 
consumers with positive surplus – the service values of the old product from the second period 
onwards would have to be a give-away to consumers.  This is true whenever the two products are sold 
in the planning horizon and the seller cannot use an upgrade policy.  The price schedules and profits 
of all product strategies for the seller are reported in the third and fourth columns of Table 1. 
By inspecting the seller’s profits, we see that strategy {L, -, -} dominates strategies {-, L, -} 
and {-, -, L}; strategy {L, H, -} dominates strategy {-, L, H}; and strategy {-, H, -} dominates strategy 
{-, -, H}.  That is, the seller would not postpone selling the same sequences of products.  The only 
remaining strategies are {L, -, -}, {L, H, -}, {L, -, H}, and {-, H, -}.  Comparing the seller’s profits 
across these four strategies, our first set of results follows.9   
 
Proposition 1 [Optimal product strategies with no upgrade policies]: 
Suppose that the seller cannot implement  an upgrade policy.10 
• [Status quo]: Strategy {L, -, -} is optimal if and only if δ>Lq  and ]1[2
1
2−−
−> n
n
Lq δ
δ
. 
• [Leapfrogging]: Strategy {-, H, -} is optimal if and only if δ<Lq , n
n
Lq δδ
δδδ
+−
−−< 221
]1[]1[
, 
and 021 <+− nδδ . 
• [Immediate sale]: Strategy {L, H, -} is optimal if and only if 
2
1 n
Lq
δ−<  and 
021 >+− nδδ . 
• [Delayed introduction]: Strategy {L, -, H} is optimal if and only if 
2
1 n
Lq
δ−> , 
n
n
Lq δδ
δδδ
+−
−−> 221
]1[]1[
 and 
]1[2
1
2−−
−< n
n
Lq δ
δ
. 
Corollary: As durability, n, increases, the necessary and sufficient conditions for delayed 
introduction become stronger.  When ∞→n , the delayed introduction strategy, {L, -, H}, is always 
dominated by one of the other three strategies. 
 
Figure 1 plots the ranges of parameters for each of the above strategies to be optimal under various 
durabilities.  Generally, three parameters characterize the incentives of the seller to delay selling the 
new product: quality of the old product, qL (since we have normalized qH to one, qL also represents the 
degree of product improvement brought by the new technology; the smaller qL is, the larger the 
quality improvement will be), product durability, n, and discount factor, δ.  As Figure 1 clearly shows, 
the region for delayed introduction gradually shrinks as n increases, and is negligible when n is 
sufficiently large (say, n ≥ 10). 
By the self-selection constraint (3) and hence the price constraint (5), it is clear that the 
existing stock of the old product imposes a negative externality on the new product.  Specifically, (5) 
limits the maximum price, which is dependent on the difference in service values provided by the two 
                                                 
9  The proofs of all results are available from the authors upon request. 
10  For brevity, we assume that the constraints are not binding.  If any one of the constraints is binding, then the seller may 
choose more than one strategy with equal probability. 
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 products at the time of evaluation, that consumers are willing to pay for the new product.  In strategy 
{L, -, H}, the old product is used in both periods 1 and 2.  Therefore, its residual value in period 3 is 
lower than that in period 2 in strategy {L, H, -}.  The seller could then charge a higher price and earn 
more revenue for the new product.  This is confirmed by the fact that HH pp 23 >  in strategies {L, -, H} 
and {L, H, -}. 
      
      
Figure 1. Optimal Product Strategies with No Upgrade Policies 
 
Further, by (4) and hence (6), the new product also imposes a negative externality on the old 
product.  This is because consumers expect to buy the new product and scrap the old product in the 
near future.  Hence, they are willing to pay only for periods in which the old product is in service (i.e., 
the new product causes premature obsolescence of the old product).  The longer consumers expect to 
use the old product, the more they are willing to pay for it.  Provided that the expected usage of the 
old product is less than its physical life span, however, the old product’s price would fall short of what 
it should deserve.  The seller then has to subsidize consumers if he wants them to buy the new product 
before the old product becomes dysfunctional. 
Therefore, the seller has to face mutual cannibalizations between the old and new products if 
he wants to sell both of them in the planning horizon.  To alleviate such cannibalizations, the seller 
could either push back the selling of the new product, or remove the old product from the market.  
The former action could lead to delayed appearance or even shelving of the new product.  The latter 
action could result in leapfrogging by the seller, and only the new product would be sold in the second 
period; consumers would not be able to use the old product in the first period.  By Proposition 1, all of 
these outcomes are possible in equilibrium. 
If the seller decides to sell both products but postpones sale of the new product to the last 
period, then two opposite forces would be in contention.  First, he would collect revenue from the new 
product at a later period, which tends to act against delay.  Second, additional depreciation of the old 
product allows him to charge a higher price for the new product (i.e., the extent of cannibalization is 
now smaller).  Also, because the old product is used for an extended period, the seller could charge a 
higher price for it too.  These price effects tend to favor delay.  Whether delayed introduction is 
optimal largely depends on the balance of these two opposite forces.  
When the discount factor, δ, is large (i.e., the discount of future values is small, or 
equivalently, the seller and consumers are patient), the first force above, owing to delayed revenue 
from the new product, becomes insignificant, and it may suggest that the seller would prefer the 
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 delayed introduction strategy; this is indeed consistent with the findings of Kornish (2001) and Radas 
and Shugan (1998).  Interestingly, this is not always the case in our setting because besides the two 
full product line strategies, {L, H, -} and {L, -, H}, the seller may also choose to shelf either the old or 
new product – after all, this is the most effective way to completely resolve the cannibalizations 
between the products!  In general, low quality improvement tends to raise the attractiveness of the 
status quo strategy, {L, -, -}, and high quality improvement, together with a high discount factor, 
tends to raise the attractiveness of leapfrogging, {-, H, -}.  Delaying sale of the new product within 
the planning horizon does not necessarily follow a high discount factor.11 
By contrast, we find that durability, n, and product improvement, qL, are stronger predictors of 
delayed introduction.  In particular, if both products are durable, and if the new product is somewhat 
better than the old one, then the gain brought by lower cannibalization (the second force above) is 
minor.  The new product prices with and without delay, Hp3  for {L, -, H} and 
Hp2  for {L, H, -}, are 
large but similar, however, and hence the loss associated with deferral of revenue from selling the 
new product is big.  The seller would then prefer to sell the new product as soon as possible, i.e., 
strategy {L, H, -} becomes optimal. 
Proposition 1 characterizes the conditions – low durability and incremental (but not radical) 
quality improvement – for delayed introduction of new products.  These conditions seem to match the 
features of many high technology products, such as MP3-compatible home stereo systems or DVD 
video recorders, and hence, may explain why their sellers often launch new products later, even 
though the enabling advanced technologies are already available. 
4.2 With an Upgrade Policy 
We now consider the case when a seller can implement an upgrade policy.  The provision of the 
upgrade option is an extra instrument for a seller to exercise price discrimination based on purchase 
history (Fudenberg and Tirole 1998; Lee and Lee 1998).  If the seller can identify consumers who 
have bought the old product, he can charge them for only the incremental utility that they receive by 
using the new product.  For those who do not own the old product, he can charge them for the full 
utility. 12  In our setting, because all consumers are identical, they exhibit the same behavior in 
equilibrium.  Nevertheless, upgrade is relevant because the seller can now make a credible threat that 
if the consumers do not buy the old product in the first period, they will face a very high price for the 
new product in subsequent periods (cf. those who trade in the old product for the new product).  This 
threat of price discrimination dissuades consumers from leapfrogging and encourages them to buy the 
old product as soon as it is available for sale. 
The analyses with an upgrade policy resemble those that we have presented above; in the five 
product strategies with single products, the price schedules and profits are identical to the previous 
case with no upgrade policies.  The prices and the seller’s profits in strategies {L, H, -}, {L, -, H} and 
{-, L, H}, however, differ from those that we have obtained above.  For illustrative purpose, we 
present the results with respect to strategy {L, H, -} below. 
In strategy {L, H, -}, the seller needs to set three prices: the price of the old product in period 
1, Lp1 , the price of the new product in period 2, 
Hp2 , and the upgrade price of the new product in 
period 2, Hup2 .13  The seller’s profit maximization problem is then: 
HuL
HL
pp
pp
HuL 21},,{, 21
max δπ +=− , 
                                                 
11  Kornish (2001) and Radas and Shugan (1998) do not consider the possibility of selling only one product in the planning 
horizon.  Therefore, their conclusion that the choice of delay is tied to the discount factor is not generalizable to other 
product line strategies.  As we shall illustrate below, however, the role of the discount factor in predicting delay is significant 
when the seller can implement an upgrade policy. 
12  For example, the existing STATA 10 user can pay less than $200 to upgrade to STATA 11. 
13  The seller needs to specify the new product price in period 2 to prevent consumers from leapfrogging.  As we shall show 
below, he makes more profits by selling the two products sequentially (offering an upgrade discount to those who own the 
old product) than by only selling the new product in period 2. 
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The left-hand side of (7)-(9) is the net surplus that consumers enjoy by buying the old product in 
period 1 and upgrading to the new product in period 2.  Similar to (1), (7) is a participation constraint.  
(8) is a self-selection constraint that restricts the upgrade price, and (9) is the constraint that ensures 
consumers do not leapfrog by skipping the old product.  Solving the profit maximization problem, the 
optimal prices and profit are: 
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Note that },,{},,{ −− = HLHL uπ .  That is, the seller can extract all surplus from consumers.  This result 
holds whenever the seller can implement an upgrade policy.  The price schedules of all product 
strategies are reported in the fifth column of Table 1.  With an upgrade policy, the profits of the seller 
always equal the consumer utilities in the second column of Table 1. 
Similar to the case with no upgrade policies (Section 4.1), the seller would not delay selling 
the same sequences of products.  With an upgrade policy, strategy {L, H, -} further dominates 
strategies {L, -, -} and {-, H, -}.  The only remaining strategies are the two with full product lines, {L, 
H, -} and {L, -, H}.  Our second proposition follows. 
 
Proposition 2 [Optimal product strategies with an upgrade policy]: 
Suppose that the seller can implement an upgrade policy. 
• [Immediate sale]: Strategy {L, H, -} is optimal if and only if nLq δ−<1 . 
• [Delayed Introduction]: Strategy {L, -, H} is optimal if and only if nLq δ−> 1 . 
Corollary: As n increases or δ decreases, the necessary and sufficient condition for delayed 
introduction becomes stronger.  When ∞→n  or 0→δ , delayed introduction is not optimal; the 
seller would always sell the new product as soon as it is available. 
 
Figure 2 depicts the condition in Proposition 2.  The implications of Proposition 2 are similar to those 
of Proposition 1, except that the discount factor now plays a more important role.  The interpretations 
are straightforward – if quality improvement is low, the discount factor is large, or durability is low, 
then delayed selling of the new product is more likely; otherwise, the seller would launch the new 
product immediately. The intuitions of these findings follow directly from those that we have 
presented in the previous section. 
Note the old product’s prices in period 1 in Table 1 – they are much higher than those in the 
case when the seller cannot implement an upgrade policy.  Recall that if the seller sells both products, 
then the new product may cause premature obsolescence of the old product because the latter is 
scrapped before the end of its physical life span.  The provision of an upgrade policy could internalize 
such an externality because even though the old product is retired before the end of its physical life 
span, it allows its owner to buy the new product at a discounted price.  Hence, the old product 
provides a higher value (cf. that in the no upgrade case) to consumers, and the seller can now charge 
for its full value.  It is also because of this trade-in value of the old product that the seller does not 
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 prefer the single-product strategies – he could always capture all consumer surplus associated with 
using the products, which is bigger than that in the single-product strategies {L, -, -} and {-, H, -}. 
Finally, with an upgrade policy, the seller’s choices in the equilibria are socially efficient, 
including those that involve delayed introductions!  This is because if the new product is sold too 
early, the old product, which could still provide useful service to consumers, would be retired 
prematurely.  This means that useful resources are wasted, which causes inefficiency in welfare.14  
Note further that efficient outcomes are not guaranteed when an upgrade policy is not feasible because 
the seller’s desperate effort to resolve the two-way cannibalizations between his products may cause 
him to drift away from socially optimal actions. 
 
 
Figure 2. Optimal Product Strategies with an Upgrade Policy 
 
5 EXTENSIONS 
In this section, we relax a few assumptions that we have made in the above analyses.  First, we allow 
the old and new products to be of different durabilities and study how the seller’s choice of strategies 
changes when the relative durability of the products varies. 
Generally, a more durable product provides a longer stream of services to consumers, who 
would then be willing to pay more for the product.  If the durability of the new product, nH, is high 
relative to the old product, nL, then the total utility that consumers enjoy by buying or upgrading to the 
new product, and hence the prices that the seller could charge for it, becomes a more important 
decision factor.  If the new product is sold later, the loss in revenue because of discount is significant.  
The intertemporal cannibalizations between the products are not affected, however, by the durability 
of the new product.  Hence, ceteris paribus, increases in nH relative to nL would entice the seller to sell 
the new product earlier, or, if originally he preferred the status quo strategy (in the scenario with no 
upgrade policies), to reconsider introducing the new product within the planning horizon. 
By contrast, if nH decreases relative to nL, the loss in revenue for selling the new product later 
is lower because now the new product is worth less to consumers.  Cannibalization rises to become a 
potent threat, and as a result, the seller would more likely postpone sale of the new product.  In the 
extreme case where the new product has a substantially shorter life span than the old product, the 
seller may even decide not to sell the new product in the planning horizon.  We summarize these 
intuitions in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3 [Change in durabilities]: 
Suppose that nH increases relative to nL. 
• The necessary and sufficient conditions for the status quo and delayed introduction strategies, 
{L, -, -} and {L, -, H}, become stronger.  The seller is less likely to shelf or delay sale of the 
new product. 
                                                 
14  Although with delayed introduction consumers cannot use the new product immediately, they can extend usage of the 
products into a more distant future.  Specifically, they can use the (old and new) products for n + 2 periods with strategy {L, 
-, H}, but only n + 1 periods with strategy {L, H, -}.  
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 • If the seller originally chose not to sell the new product, it is now possible for him to re-
introduce it in the planning horizon and sell it in the last period. 
The opposite is true if nH decreases relative to nL.  If 2−< LH nn , it is possible for the seller to shelf 
the new product (i.e., choose the status quo strategy) even though he is able to use an upgrade policy.  
We next consider the case where the seller and consumers have different discount factors.  Let 
the discount factor of the seller be θ and that of consumers be δ.  Intuitively, one might think that a 
less patient seller (i.e., θ is smaller) would sell the new product as soon as possible to capture a higher 
discounted revenue.  This conjecture is indeed correct if the seller can implement an upgrade policy.  
Interestingly, if an upgrade policy is not viable, a decrease in θ may induce the seller to shelf the new 
product even though he might have originally planned to sell it!  This is because the new product 
reduces the price that he could charge for the old product in the first period, which is now more 
important owing to a higher discount of future revenue.   
Recall that with an upgrade policy, the seller could internalize the cannibalization caused by 
the new product, and could always charge the full price for the old product.  Hence the change in the 
discount factor only affects the incremental revenue that he receives from those who upgrade to the 
new product.  A lower discount factor (i.e., a higher discount of future revenue) would naturally 
prompt him to launch the new product earlier. 
By contrast, with no upgrade policies, the reverse cannibalization from the new product to the 
old one is significant.  The seller then has to balance carefully the gain from launching the new 
product in the future against the loss in first period revenue from the old product.  If he is less patient 
(i.e., when θ decreases), his concern about the old product’s price is higher than that about the new 
product’s price.  Hence, he has a higher tendency to shelf the new product and a lower tendency to 
leapfrog.  The choice of delayed introduction against immediate sale and leapfrogging is, however, 
ambiguous.15  We summarize these results in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4 [Change in discount factors]: 
Suppose that the seller’s discount factor, θ, decreases relative to that of the consumers, δ. 
• With no upgrade policies, the necessary and sufficient conditions for status quo become 
weaker.  The seller has a higher tendency to shelf the new product.  His choice over the other 
three product strategies is ambiguous. 
• With an upgrade policy, the sufficient condition for delayed introduction becomes stronger.  
The seller has a higher tendency to sell the new product earlier. 
 
Finally, we assume zero marginal costs for both the old and new products.  If marginal cost is 
positive and correlates with product quality, its impact on the seller’s product strategies is 
straightforward: if cost increases with quality, then selling the new product is less attractive to the 
seller (cf. the case that we have analyzed in Section 4), and he may delay its sale or shelf it.  The 
opposite is true if cost decreases with quality – he may launch it earlier, or in the extreme case, 
leapfrog and skip the old product.  What is more interesting here is that a high marginal cost for the 
new product may make upgrade less lucrative for the seller because other than participation and self-
selection constraints, there is an additional cost constraint in the seller’s maximization problem that 
places a lower bound on the upgrade price that is set by the seller.  An immediate conjecture is that 
the conditions for the seller to provide upgrade discounts to existing customers would become more 
stringent, and he would more likely choose product strategies that involve selling only one product in 
the planning horizon.  To prove this result, however, we need a more general model with various 
marginal costs and endogenous choices of upgrade policies.  We leave this problem to future research. 
                                                 
15  The seller’s revenue from selling the new product in delayed introduction involves a second-order discount, which 
reduces his revenue rapidly as θ decreases.  Further, in the delayed introduction strategy, his revenue from selling the old 
product is also a function of the consumers’ discount factor, δ.  The effect of a change in θ relative to δ depends on their 
relative magnitude.  If θ is large, decreases in θ would make the new product substantially less attractive; hence, delay is less 
appealing to the seller.  By contrast, if θ is small, a further decrease does not make much difference, and delay could be 
preferred because it increases the old product’s price.  Therefore, the seller does not unequivocally prefer or avoid delayed 
introduction (cf. immediate sale and leapfrogging). 
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 6 NO COMMITMENT 
What happen if the seller cannot make credible commitment on product strategies?  Note that the 
seller always has incentives to launch the new product after the old product was sold in an earlier 
period.  When he cannot credibly commit not to sell the new product in the future, consumers would 
adjust their expectations and refuse to pay a high price for the old product.  Therefore, when 
commitment is incredible, it is not possible for the seller to obtain the price and profit in the first row 
of Table 1 from the old product.  Accordingly, he would always sell the new product, and strategy {L, 
-, -} would not constitute an equilibrium.  Proposition One needs to be slightly revised – the status 
quo strategy is no longer stable.  In equilibrium, with no upgrade policies, the seller would choose 
either leapfrogging, immediate sale, or delayed introduction.  Further, when there is no commitment, 
delayed introduction is always optimal under some conditions even if the durability, n, becomes very 
large (cf. Corollary One, where delayed introduction is not optimal when ∞→n ).  
The results with an upgrade policy (i.e., Proposition Two) are not sensitive to the assumption 
on commitment, because in equilibrium the seller would always sell both the old and new products.  
Hence, regardless of whether the seller can make credible commitment, consumers always expect to 
buy both products, and the seller fulfills such an expectation by setting the corresponding prices.  
These findings may explain the practices in software industry where the extent of quality 
improvement and discount factor play more important role than durability in driving the delayed 
product introduction. 16 Finally, Propositions Three and Four need to be revised.  Again, status quo is 
no longer an equilibrium strategy; the seller would not shelf the new product.17 
Note that when there is no commitment the seller makes less profit in some parameter ranges.  
This resembles the standard result of durable goods monopolists being worse off because of the 
inability to commit to restricting output in future periods (e.g., Bulow 1982; Coase 1972).  Generally, 
commitment ameliorates the time inconsistency problem, which persists when we consider the timing 
of sale of new products (cf. output choices, which is often studied in the literature). 
 
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Using a three-period model, we have shown that a monopolistic seller would at times prefer to delay 
introducing a new product, even if technologies for the product are already developed and it is 
costless to sell it to consumers.  This is because the old and new products affect each other adversely, 
which is similar to cannibalizations in standard product differentiation studies (e.g., Moorthy 1984; 
Moorthy and Png 1992; Mussa and Rosen 1978).  In the product differentiation literature, the seller 
mitigates cannibalizations by dispersing his products; in our setting, he postpones selling the new 
product.  We have characterized a few equilibria with delayed introduction of the new product, and 
studied their changes with respect to market and product parameters. 
The findings of our study are relevant to high-technology products because their quality and 
life spans are increasingly being determined by external forces, such as developments in peripheral 
components, communications standards, or hardware and software architectures. In particular, sellers 
of these products often cannot control when new technologies arrive and when their old products 
become obsolete.  Hence, for them, product innovation and introduction are two separate decisions – 
they might not be able to endogenize the extent of product innovation, but they could always control 
whether and when to sell new products.  Because of this separation of sale from innovation, we find 
that in social optimum, a seller may defer introducing a new product; this is an insight that cannot be 
obtained in prior studies of product introduction (Fishman and Rob 2000; Lee and Lee 1998; 
Waldman 1996a).18  It also explains why in some markets, sellers do not deploy new and superior 
                                                 
16  A famous delay in the software industry is the introduction of Windows Vista, which was launched more than five years 
after the introductin of its predecessor, Windows XP.. 
17  The detailed analysis results for the no-commitment case are available from the authors upon request. 
18  For example, in Fishman and Rob’s (2000) model, if a seller can offer an upgrade discount or if old products are not 
durable, then the timing decisions of new products are always socially optimal.  That is, there is no “delay” in welfare 
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 technologies to create new products.  The inclusion of durability as a model parameter also allows us 
to extend our insights directly to products that exhibit different life spans (perhaps because of high 
dependencies on external parts, technologies, or trends).   
Our findings provide interesting insights for pricing and policy formulations.  First, uniform 
pricing of new products is not desirable – a seller should seek to provide upgrade discounts to existing 
customers whenever feasible.  Second, if a seller cannot control product durability, planned 
obsolescence that suppresses the value of old products (Bulow 1986; Waldman 1993, 1996b) may not 
be feasible.  Rather than desperately removing old products from the market, the seller could launch 
new products later; this enhances the prices of both products and could sometimes result in higher 
profits.  Third, although stipulating minimum levels of durability could lead to slower technological 
progress (Fishman and Robs 2000), it allows consumers to enjoy new products earlier, provided that 
the enabling technologies for the new products are available.  Hence, it may benefit consumers, if for 
example, protracted licenses of 3G cellular networks are awarded to telecommunications companies, 
or long service contracts are extended to pay-TV operators and broadband Internet service providers.  
Finally, facilitating upgrade or trade-in is especially important in encouraging an impatient seller to 
launch better products.  Measures that help such a seller administer trade-in (e.g., reinforcing the 
credibility of buyback guarantees) or policies that support renting instead of selling a product are 
useful; those that prohibit the seller from discriminating against new customers or retaining controls 
on old products should generally be avoided. 
This paper also extends the research on durable goods monopolists.  Similar to that literature 
(e.g., Bulow 1982, 1986; Levinthal and Purohit 1989; Waldman 1993, 1996b), the seller in our study 
faces a time inconsistency problem.  Departing from that literature, however, he cannot resolve the 
problem by adjusting output, R&D investment, or durability (all of these are moot in this paper).  
Instead, he can manipulate timing of sale.  As advocated by Waldman (2003, p.140), “the problem of 
time inconsistency is potentially more important for other choices than for output”.  We have certainly 
shown that timing of sale per se is yet another such “other choices”, and it deserves more attention 
because sellers have high degrees of freedom in determining when to sell new products (cf. choices of 
R&D, durability, or planned obsolescence that are often not subject to control by sellers because of 
external research, or the political and market environments). 
Our study opens up several avenues of future research.  First, we could allow for dynamic 
demands with new consumers entering the market in each period, or incorporate heterogeneity in taste 
for quality.  Second, it would be interesting to see if competition dilutes the incentives to delay new 
product introductions. As we have shown in the scenario with an upgrade policy, consumers prefer to 
delay the purcahse of the new product. Thus, we speculate that in a market consisting of an incumbent 
and new entrants there may still exist a range of parameters favoring delayed product introduction. 
Third, we have assumed that the new product does not affect the quality of the old product, but this 
might not be the case for products that exhibit network externalities or require compatible standards 
(Padmanabhan et al. 1997).  Finally, it may be worthwhile to study the interplay of delayed 
introduction and preannouncement (e.g., Bayus et al. 2001; Hendricks and Singhal 1997), the latter is 
commonly practiced for software, information technology and electronics products.  It is instructive to 
investigate if preannouncement raises consumer expectations of new products, and whether delay in 
such a context serves the same function as in this paper. 
Despite these future extensions, it is clear that the incentives of durable goods sellers to 
deploy advanced technologies in new products must be closely monitored, or else consumers may 
simply not see the light of better products. 
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